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What can and can’t crowding theories tell us about farmers’ 1 
‘environmental’ intentions in post-Agri-Environment Scheme 2 
contexts?  3 
Helena S Darragh and Steven B Emery 4 
 5 
Abstract 6 
The termination of the Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) Agri-Environment Scheme in England 7 
provides a unique opportunity for testing and exploring the so-called crowding-out theory.  The theory 8 
posits that payment for the provision of public goods leads to a reduction in the intrinsic motivation 9 
for their supply.  Through a small qualitative case study of farmers in Southwest England we explore 10 
farmers’ intentions to continue with ‘environmental behaviours’ following the cessation of ELS.  11 
Contrary to the crowding-out theory we find that farmers will continue with longstanding 12 
‘environmental practices’ that were financially rewarded by the ELS, but will pick and choose 13 
whether to continue with newly introduced practices depending on how they fit with farmers’ existing 14 
cultural, economic and instrumental priorities.  Moreover, we argue that the crowding-out theory is 15 
based on a set of assumptions and simplifications that do not adequately help us interpret the 16 
relationship between farmers’ motives, practices and intentions.  In particular, we show that intrinsic 17 
and extrinsic motives cannot straightforwardly be separated and that definitions of what constitutes an 18 
‘environmental behaviour’ are far more complex than is often assumed. 19 
 20 
 21 
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 26 
Introduction 27 
The end of the so-called ‘broad and shallow’ Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) Agri-28 
environment Scheme (AES) in England (phasing out from 2015) provides a unique 29 
opportunity to investigate the much-feared concept of ‘crowding-out’ that has been applied to 30 
the theory and practice of subsidising the provision of public goods. In environmental 31 
contexts, crowding-out postulates that land managers who had previously provided public 32 
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goods for free, but that are subsequently remunerated for the provision of said public goods, 33 
will come to expect payment for their continued provision.  If that payment changes, or is 34 
removed, therefore, it is assumed that land managers will cease to provide the public good 35 
because a new expectation for payment has been established (Vatn, 2010).  The crowding-out 36 
question arises in the current situation because many farmers in England that had been 37 
eligible for the ELS will not be eligible for its replacement scheme (Countryside 38 
Stewardship).  Indeed, the fear of crowding-out was specifically raised by academic 39 
commentators upon the introduction ELS (Hodge and Reader, 2010). 40 
In this paper we report findings from a small, exploratory case study of twelve  farmers in 41 
Southwest England.  Using semi-structured interviews, farmers’ reflections on the existing 42 
AES in England and their thoughts about the forthcoming changes to AES provision were 43 
sought.  In particular, farmers’ post-ELS intentions to continue with ‘environmental’ 44 
behaviours that had been supported by the ELS were explored.  We also sought to 45 
contextualise these intentions in terms of farmers’ varying perceptions of ‘the environment’ 46 
as well as their normative and diachronic understandings of ‘good farming’ (Silvasti, 2003; 47 
Burton, 2004).  In doing so, our aim is to engage critically with the theory of crowding-out, 48 
which, we argue, oversimplifies assumptions about farmers’ intentions that are based on a 49 
rational economistic approach to decision-making.  Moreover, in order to fully understand 50 
farmers’ pre-, in- and post-subsidy behaviours, we argue that it is necessary to understand 51 
what motivates the provision of so-called public goods in the first place as well as how 52 
conceptualisations of the ‘environment’ are interpreted and employed rhetorically by farmers 53 
in support of their own values and interests. 54 
With the increased trialling and normalisation of Payment for Ecosystem Service (PES) 55 
approaches under neoliberal environmental management regimes our findings —albeit based 56 
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on a small sample — are not only relevant to the continued development of agri-57 
environmental policies and schemes, but can  contribute to our understanding of the longer-58 
term implications of environmental commodification on farmers’ behaviours and intentions 59 
across a range of international contexts. 60 
The Demise of Entry Level Stewardship in England 61 
We do not have space here to provide an exhaustive history of AES policy and provision in 62 
England.  Numerous studies have examined the historic Environmentally Sensitive Areas 63 
(ESA) scheme (1987-2005) (Ovenden et al., 1998; Hodge and McNally, 1998) and the 64 
Countryside Stewardship Scheme (CSS) (1991-2005) (Morris, 2004; Carey et al., 2002) as 65 
well as the outgoing Environmental Stewardship Scheme (comprised of Higher Level and 66 
Entry Level Stewardship) (Ewald et al., 2010; Quillerou and Fraser, 2010).  These all derive 67 
ultimately from the EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and are adopted through 68 
English policy.  Full details of the new Countryside Stewardship Scheme are available from 69 
the gov.uk website.
1
 70 
Here, we will provide brief background to the reasons behind the emergence and demise of 71 
the ELS scheme.  ELS was introduced following the 2003 reforms to the CAP.  The reforms 72 
had different implications for different farmers in England but, in general, meant a transfer of 73 
funding away from agricultural production per se, toward an area-based payment contingent 74 
upon good agricultural and environmental practice and the increased availability of funding 75 
through AES.  Such a shift was politically expedient in England (but throughout Europe too) 76 
since it could help convince international trading partners (and the WTO) that subsidies were 77 
not trade distorting (since they were not linked to production) (Potter and Burney, 2002).  78 
Additionally, increasingly restless domestic taxpayers could be assured that their money was 79 
being put to good use.   80 
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From a cynical perspective, therefore, it could be claimed that the straightforward ELS was a 81 
means of ensuring continued (and more palatable) subsidy support to the majority of 82 
farmers.
2
 This is because the ELS introduced a revolution in AES support by being open to 83 
all farmers who could meet point-based criteria for the implementation of (what were often) 84 
straightforward measures.  The preceding ESA and CSS had only been available in areas 85 
deemed to be of high nature value, or on a competitive basis for the implementation of more 86 
demanding environmental measures.  The openness and straightforwardness of the ELS led to 87 
it being labelled a ‘broad and shallow’ scheme (Boatman et al., 2008, p. 25).  In this sense, 88 
the scheme was highly successful in encouraging uptake with 72% of land in England under 89 
some form of AES in 2015 (Defra, 2016).  The less cynical perspective, therefore, is that ELS 90 
was introduced to get a large number of farmers and a large area of land engaged in 91 
environmental behaviours that had hitherto been under no form of agri-environmental 92 
regulation.  This could be seen as desirable on account of a recognised need to reduce the 93 
administrative costs of AES and to consider the environmental value of more ‘regular’ 94 
agricultural landscapes (outside of designated ‘high nature value’ areas), which had seen 95 
significant declines of important species such as farmland birds (PCFFF [Curry Report], 96 
2002, p. 79).   97 
ELS has been criticised for an at best partial delivery of its intended environmental benefits 98 
(Davey et al., 2010a); for not, therefore, being cost-effective (Breeze et al., 2014); for not 99 
allowing tailoring to regional differences (Davey et al., 2010b; Emery and Franks, 2012); for 100 
allowing farmers too much choice of options, facilitating uptake but hindering environmental 101 
benefits (Hodge and Reader, 2010), and; for not providing a mechanism for delivering 102 
environmental benefits at the greater-than-farm scale (Emery and Franks, 2012; Franks and 103 
Emery, 2013; McKenzie et al., 2013). Many of these criticisms, as well as a tightening of the 104 
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purse strings following the 2008 recession were instrumental in the re-design of AES in the 105 
EU and England which led to the complete removal of the broad and shallow type scheme.  106 
Instead, the new Countryside Stewardship Scheme incorporates a Mid-tier, Higher-tier, and 107 
capital grant scheme, all of which are competitively allocated and regionally tailored. The 108 
area of farmland in England involved in AES is expected to halve (from 5.1 million hectares 109 
in 2015 (Defra, 2016).  This will leave 36,100 ELS agreement holders contemplating whether 110 
they wished to apply, whether they were eligible to apply and whether they would be 111 
successful in the event of application to the new CSS.  We hope to shed light in this paper 112 
therefore: On whether the large proportion of those 36,100 farmers who come out of ELS 113 
altogether will continue to implement environmental measures in the absence of funding to 114 
do so?  And, more importantly, whether they will cease to carry out measures that they had 115 
performed unpaid prior to joining ELS because a right for payment for the performance of 116 
those measures has now been established? If the crowding-out theory holds true, then the 117 
answer to the second of these questions will be in the affirmative.  To allow a fuller 118 
interrogation of these questions the following Sections expand on the theory of crowding-out; 119 
the structural, normative and knowledge-based influences on farmers’ agri-environmental 120 
behaviour, and; farmers’ environmental perceptions and constructions. 121 
 Crowding-Out 122 
The crowding-out effect emerged as an academic interest in the 1970s in the disciplines of 123 
economics and psychology, and was subsequently integrated and developed in the domain of 124 
behavioural economics (Frey and Jegen, 2001). It concerns the predicted negative 125 
consequence (a reduction in supply) of paying individuals for the provision of public goods 126 
that had previously been provided out of an intrinsic motivation (or for ‘free’).  127 
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Notably, it has figured extensively in the domain of environmental management, policy and 128 
economics (for instance, Berglund and Matti, 2006; Vatn, 2010; Corbera, 2012; Kerr et al., 129 
2012).  Conventional environmental economics emerged in the 1960s (Pearce, 2002) and 130 
sought to address the market failures inherent in resource and environmental management; 131 
namely that a raft of environmental benefits (positive externalities) and environmental 132 
disadvantages (negative externalities) generated by human behaviour went unpriced, leading 133 
to the under-protection and over-exploitation of the natural environment.  In terms of positive 134 
externalities, the conventional economic theory held that paying individuals/groups for the 135 
provision of environmental goods would increase their supply.  In contemporary 136 
environmental policy this is best exemplified by the discourse and practice of PES.  137 
Crowding-out, in contrast, argues that the opposite is (or can be) true: that monetarising the 138 
provision of environmental goods and services can actually serve to diminish their supply. 139 
In agri-environmental contexts crowding-out has been concisely defined as 'the reduction of 140 
willingness to engage in environmentally friendly actions due to being paid to do so' (Meyer 141 
et al., 2014, p.191).  This reduced willingness is on account of the ‘crowding-out’ of intrinsic 142 
motives (those derived from a personal sense of satisfaction/reward in conducting a particular 143 
action) by extrinsic motives (those derived from the anticipated material benefits derived 144 
from the completion of a particular action).  The literature reports many instances in which 145 
farmers’ conducting of conservation practices — such as taking measures to enhance 146 
biodiversity, maintain landscape features, or minimise pollution —  is motivated by intrinsic 147 
satisfaction rather than any associated material reward (e.g. Greiner et al., 2009). 148 
 As reported in the previous section, Hodge and Reader (2010, p. 279) criticise ELS for 149 
encouraging little change in behaviour among farmers, stating that it allows farmers to 150 
‘choose options that they would have undertaken anyway’ which may not maximise ‘the 151 
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environmental benefits or provision of public goods’ (see also Falconer, 2000; Boonstra et 152 
al., 2011; Vanslembrouck et al., 2002; Mills, 2012).  However, it should be noted that one of 153 
the original intentions of the ELS, as set out in the Curry Report (PCFFF, 2002), was to 154 
address criticisms of the previous AES pertaining to the fact that they did not reward existing 155 
good practice.  Hence, the ELS sought to correct market failures by rewarding farmers for 156 
their continued supply of positive environmental externalities.   157 
Hodge and Reader (2010) also express a strong concern relating to ELS and the potential for 158 
crowding-out.  They argue that it can replace the intrinsic stewardship ethic among farmers 159 
with an expectation for payment: 160 
ELS effectively extends a right to receive payment for the provision of environmental goods 161 
(or more specifically for undertaking actions that are thought to be likely to provide environ- 162 
mental goods), irrespective of what would happen in the absence of the payment. There is no 163 
need either to threaten to reduce the future supply or to take any actions that are required in 164 
order to enhance supply. This signals that landholders generally may expect to receive 165 
payment for the provision of public goods. As such, the ELS makes it explicit that there is no 166 
duty on landholders to undertake the actions available as options within the scheme in that 167 
the state is now offering payment for undertaking them and implies that continued supply into 168 
the future may become dependant [sic] on the continuation of government payments. (Hodge 169 
and Reader, 2010, pp. 279-280, emphasis added). 170 
The final sentence of this extract resonates entirely with the current situation (the termination 171 
of ELS) and provides a foundational justification for our analysis here.  Despite some 172 
evidence for crowding-out in agri-environmental contexts (Andrews et al., 2013; Herzon and 173 
Mikk, 2007 [cited by de Snoo et al., 2014, p. 67]), the agri-environmental literature more 174 
often, like Hodge and Reader (2010), identifies crowding-out as a potential concern rather 175 
than providing concrete evidence for it.  Moreover, many recognise the more complex 176 
relationship between intrinsic motives, financial incentives and behaviours.  Duncan et al. 177 
(2014), based on research in Australia, provide evidence which does not support the 178 
crowding-out effect.  They show that previous recipients of conservation funding were more, 179 
rather than less, likely to undertake further conservation behaviour in the absence of funding.  180 
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Unfortunately, Duncan et al.’s analysis does not yield an explanation for the motives behind 181 
the increased conservation behaviour, but they might be linked to the counter phenomenon of 182 
crowding-in; whereby financial incentives encourage the formation of new intrinsic motives 183 
which may outlast the monetary support (Frey and Jegen, 2001).  In a review of the 184 
‘crowding effect’ in conservation policy Rode et al. (2015) find evidence for both crowding-185 
out and crowding-in of intrinsic motivations for conservation behaviour.  They also report, 186 
however, that there exists an inadequate understanding of the intrinsic motivations that 187 
precede payment schemes and that cultural and contextual factors serve to complicate the 188 
determination of clear relationships between intrinsic motives, financial motives and 189 
environmental behaviours.  In response to this shortcoming, in this paper we also consider the 190 
reasons behind farmers’ pre-subsidy behaviours and how these relate to their post-subsidy 191 
intentions.  Moreover, we explore how these motives and intentions are mediated normatively 192 
through recourse to the cultural ideal of the ‘good farmer’ (Silvasti, 2003; Burton, 2004; 193 
Riley, 2016). We argue that crowding-out proceeds on the same narrowly rational 194 
economistic basis as the theories that it wishes to challenge and suggest that cultural 195 
interpretation can better help us understand the likely motives and behaviours of farmers in 196 
post-subsidy contexts. 197 
Farming culture and engagement in AES 198 
There are numerous studies that attempt to reveal the reasons behind farmers’ acceptance and 199 
uptake of AES. Quantitatively derived studies tend to produce results indicating a significant 200 
influence of structural factors, such as age, farm size/type and income (Damianos and 201 
Giannakopoulos, 2002; Desfranceso et al., 2008) whilst more qualitative techniques 202 
emphasise the impact of personal values, culture and identity (Morris and Potter, 1995; 203 
Morris et al., 2000).  Whilst the economic benefits of ELS combined with the minimal 204 
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effort/change required by farmers to receive payment (Hodge and Reader, 2010) are 205 
emphasised as important determinants of ELS uptake, others have argued that there exist 206 
wider benefits to farmers from AES engagement.  Sutherland (2011) draws attention to the 207 
number of farmers already adopting environmentally friendly techniques, not out of a 208 
primary concern for the environment, but for other motives such as reducing input costs.  209 
Alternatively, Lokhorst et al. (2011) argue that farmers have environmental motives 210 
associated with self-identity, but these are pronounced for unsubsidised rather than subsidised 211 
environmental behaviours.  This contrasts, therefore, with cultural arguments relating to the 212 
‘good farmer’ model which stipulate that farming identities (of dominantly productivist 213 
character) serve as barriers to environmental behaviours (Burton, 2004; Burton et al., 2008).  214 
It also contrasts, however, with developments of the good farming model which suggest that 215 
AES have positively altered farmers’ notions of goodness within their self-identification 216 
processes to incorporate environmental responsibilities (Soini and Aakula, 2007; Sutherland 217 
and Darnhofer, 2012; Riley, 2016).  Such interpretations help explain why crowding-in, as 218 
opposed to crowding-out might be expected as a result of AES engagement; i.e. by altering 219 
notions of good farming, an intrinsic motive toward environmental behaviours may be 220 
created by farmers’ involvement in AES.  However, Lockhorst et al.’s interpretation seems 221 
consistent with crowding-out arguments since it suggests that intrinsically/normatively 222 
motivated environmental behaviours that take place outside of subsidised schemes might lose 223 
that normative motive once a financial incentive becomes available.  As argued by de Snoo et 224 
al. (2013, p. 67) ‘actions that were originally driven by cultural perceptions of “good 225 
farming” practice may become dependent on monetary stimuli’.   226 
What Lockhorst et al. (2011) are not able to explain, however, is just what, exactly, farmers 227 
consider non-subsidised environmental behaviours to entail.  What we wish to argue in this 228 
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paper is that farmers may have very different conceptualisations of ‘the environment’ of 229 
‘nature’ and of ‘conservation practices’ to conservationists or agri-environmental 230 
practitioners and theorists.  Hence it may be wholly consistent for them to self-identify with 231 
practices outside of AES that they consider, or represent, as ‘environmental’ (but that others 232 
would not), whilst at the same time distancing themselves from AES induced practices (often 233 
seen as imposed and unwelcome) which they may consider, or again represent, to be anti-234 
environmental, or that oppose their own conceptualisations of appropriate conservation 235 
behaviour or good farm stewardship (Harrison and Burgess, 1998).  It is necessary to 236 
consider, therefore, whether farmers’ self-reporting of environmental practices and values 237 
(either in spite of, or because of, AES engagement) is indicative of a (existing or emerging) 238 
normative association or because it has become a useful discourse with which to present their 239 
claims and arguments to those outside the farming community. 240 
 241 
Farmers’ perceptions and representations of the 'environment' 386 
Extensive literature exists that tries to discern farmers' ways of perceiving concepts such as 387 
'environment', 'nature' and 'conservation' (Boonstra et al., 2011; McEachern, 1992; McHenry, 388 
1998; Setten, 2004; Vergunst, 2012). These perceptions are often wrapped up with culture, 389 
knowledge and identity. An awareness that the way in which farmers engage with these terms 390 
is often different from those who influence agri-environmental policy (such as ecologists and 391 
conservationists) is crucial in order to understand farmers' engagement with AES. 392 
Whilst McHenry (1998) found that most farmers were willing to comply with conservation 393 
measures in AES, she argues that as environmental issues have become increasingly 394 
important in agricultural policy, farmers have adapted their understanding of the environment 395 
to encompass their previous 'good farming' practices, labelling these practices as 396 
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conservationist behaviour as a means of justifying their continuation (see also Setten, 2001). 397 
Evidently, these previous approaches to ‘good farming’ are unlikely to conform with a 398 
conservationist’s understanding of appropriate conservation behaviours. Drawing on work by 399 
Cary (1993), McHenry (1998) suggests that this reaction to AES is indicative of an adoption 400 
of 'symbolic conservation' practice in agriculture, whereby farmers have continued to perform 401 
actions for instrumental gains, but claim to have done so for conservational reasons (see also 402 
Boonstra et al., 2011). 403 
Given that 'facts, values, and personal experiences are all bound up together so that nature 404 
and its conservation are social and cultural constructs' (Harrison, 1993 [cited by McHenry, 405 
1998, p. 1039]), dissecting farmers' understanding of conservation and environmental 406 
concepts reveals much about their identity and knowledge. Farming knowledge is generally 407 
passed down through generational ties and secured through constant engagement with the 408 
land (Fischler, 2000; Wilson, 1997; Setten, 2001). This provides farmers with a wealth of 409 
local and site-specific knowledge which has shaped the very landscapes AES are attempting 410 
to protect. This deep connection with the land has led farmers to feel that they possess the 411 
best knowledge on how to look after the countryside (Harrison et al., 1998; McEachern, 412 
1992).  413 
Of course, different groups of individuals view the concepts of ‘conservation’ and 414 
‘environment’ in different ways dependent on their own values, beliefs and circumstances 415 
(McHenry, 1998). This causes a problem in the creation of AES, where scientific input, often 416 
deemed as 'expert' knowledge, contributes overwhelmingly to shape agri-environment policy 417 
and to determine how farmers should manage their land. Burgess et al. (2000) accumulate 418 
perspectives from both farmers and conservationists to demonstrate the variance in how both 419 
groups would go about preserving the environment, as well as their perspectives on what 420 
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constitutes a healthy ecological environment (see also Soini and Aakkula, 2006).  Farmers 421 
often have valuable knowledge to contribute in this regard but feel that their experience is 422 
largely overlooked by policymakers (Lokhorst et al., 2011; Harrison et al., 1998; Wynne, 423 
1992). This ignorance of farmers' local knowledge by policymakers can not only result in 424 
poor environmental decisions, but can also lead farmers to believe that their identity as 425 
managers of the countryside is being threatened and belittled (McHenry, 1998; Wynne, 426 
1992). In order to protect their collective identity, farmers may consider and represent 427 
different behaviours as 'conservation', thereby challenging the 'expert' opinions used to guide 428 
policymaking (Wynne, 1992).  Subsequently, the literature has emphasised the need for 429 
farmers’ opinions to be incorporated into agri-environmental policy (Burgess et al., 2000; 430 
Malawska et al., 2014; Prager and Nagel, 2008; Emery and Franks, 2012). 431 
Methods 432 
Twelve face-to-face semi-structured interviews with farmers located across Dorset and 433 
Wiltshire were conducted during July-August, 2014.  These counties were chosen on account 434 
of their identification as ‘target counties’ for ELS as part of the Campaign for the Farmed 435 
Environment (the target counties were selected to secure ELS coverage on seventy-five 436 
percent of land that was formerly set-aside) (Campaign for the Farmed Environment, 2011; 437 
Clothier, 2013). Our empirical focus during the interviews has been detailed in the 438 
introduction. Consistent with methods adopted in other agri-environment studies (Morris and 439 
Potter, 1995; Beedell and Rehman, 1999; Beedell and Rehman, 2000; Holstead et al., 2014; 440 
Morris et al., 2000; Sutherland, 2011; Sutherland and Darnhofer, 2012), the Yellow Pages 441 
were used to contact farmers, conversing over the telephone to arrange a visit appointment 442 
(see Burton and Wilson, 1999 for a discussion).  All farmers provided informed consent for 443 
involvement in the research and are referred to numerically to preserve anonymity.  444 
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Interviews took place at the farmers’ home, were recorded with a digital dictaphone and 445 
lasted between 30 and 120 minutes. Farmers were asked for their opinion on the delivery and 446 
environmental effectiveness of the ELS scheme, the reasons for their decision to implement 447 
the scheme, the degree to which their farming methods had altered as a result of adopting 448 
ELS and whether they would continue with ELS measures after the CAP reform. Discussions 449 
also involved farmers’ views on AES policy-making and their reflections on whether they 450 
perceived the wider farming community to be more environmentally engaged than in the past 451 
as a result of the introduction and mainstreaming of AES in agricultural policy. 452 
[Table 1 Here] 453 
Farms varied in terms of size, type and engagement with AES, among other factors. Table 1 454 
shows the different characteristics of the farmers interviewed. Farmers who were involved in 455 
HLS schemes were not investigated with regard to the crowding-out discussion, since these 456 
farmers were likely to be unaffected by the termination of ELS due to either being able to 457 
continue with their current HLS scheme until the end of their ten-year implementation, or 458 
confident that they would be able to successfully reapply for the new CS. Nonetheless, these 459 
individuals were able to offer valuable insight in other areas as highlighted in the discussion.  460 
All recordings were fully transcribed and coded using a thematic approach (Gibbs, 2007). 461 
The small-scale nature of our sample ensures that our observations and predictions have to be 462 
treated cautiously in terms of their generalisability.  Nevertheless, our approach allows for a 463 
detailed analysis of the complexity and contradictions inherent in the application of crowding 464 
theories to agri-environmental contexts which, we maintain, ensures that the significance of 465 
our findings and interpretation extend beyond the limits of our specific case study. 466 
 467 
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Findings and Discussion 468 
Farmers’ motivations 469 
A dominant reason offered by the respondents for initially entering into AES was financial. 470 
Without it, some implied that implementation of AES would have been unlikely. 471 
 I couldn't do what I'm doing without the payments. You've gotta' remember, it's the 472 
payments that make it worthwhile” (farmer 2) 473 
 “It's the money which is the incentive, the money comes in handy, it helps” (farmer 7) 474 
"It's obviously got the carrot of the payment but you've got to have some carrot there to get 475 
people to do it." (farmer 10) 476 
Evidently, providing farmers with monetary payment for conservation practice has a strong 477 
influence on AES participation as found by Boonstra et al. (2011), Damianos and 478 
Giannakopoulos (2002) and Desfranceso et al. (2008).  Moreover, the majority of farmers 479 
explicitly stated that the adoption of an AES had changed their farming practice marginally, if 480 
at all. 481 
 "You're just getting money for something you're already doing" (farmer 1) 482 
 "In many ways we qualify for ELS without doing anything at all, 'cus there's extra points 483 
for cattle and sheep grazing together, which we do and would do it anyway, whether we 484 
were being paid for it, or not... it [the farm] wouldn't be any different" (farmer 5) 485 
“Apart from [being careful with fertiliser], that was all I had to really do, the rest was just, 486 
things we'd normally do, we always cut hedges, we always maintain water courses” (farmer 487 
4) 488 
These extracts support the findings from Falconer (2000), Vanslembrouck et al. (2002) and 489 
Hodge and Reader (2010), who state that farmers will adopt the options most suited to their 490 
current farm practices and resonates with the critics who feel that the ELS does not deliver 491 
much environmental improvement relative to the national expenditure on it. 492 
The continuance of previous practices under ELS alongside the central emergence of a 493 
financial motive may also, however, support concerns relating to crowding-out. It suggests 494 
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practices that were once intrinsically motivated have now come to be valued financially.  495 
However, it is important to point out that the farmers suggest the financial motives were 496 
important for joining the schemes, rather than for conducting the environmental behaviours 497 
per se. This is an important distinction, since the financial motive is used to justify the 498 
burdens associated with joining the scheme (see below) and may run alongside (rather than 499 
replace) a remaining intrinsic (or alternative) motive for continuing with the subsidised 500 
behaviour. 501 
A common theme highlighted in the responses was that the payments received for AES do 502 
not cover the cost of its implementation.  503 
 "It’s not really making the money, it's a nice cheque when it comes in but then you work 504 
out how much you're getting for it and it's not worth it ... the sums sort of add up so if you 505 
want to do it you can convince yourself 'oh well it's not costing us too much to do it', if you 506 
add everything in moderation … it doesn't really pay... you can't regard it as a business 507 
decision doing these sort of environmental schemes" (farmer 11) 508 
So in spite of the majority of farmers stating that money was an important incentive for 509 
joining the ELS many also stress that the money on its own would not be a sufficient 510 
incentive, which suggests that other reasons for participation must exist too. Although the 511 
necessity of payment was a common theme, many of the same farmers later alluded to 512 
notions of environmental responsibility; 513 
“I think they [farmers] do it because they really want to do it, they really want to produce 514 
the effects of this, it's not about the scheme, or the money, they want to do it, irrespective of 515 
the scheme…. These guys really want to do it, and they'd still do it anyway” (farmer 4) 516 
 “Everything we do has to work with the environment rather than against it, or just ignore 517 
it. It's very important to us that we maintain it anyway” (farmer 4) 518 
 519 
Moreover, the farmers viewed the AES as a means of recognition for previous farming 520 
practices that had sustained important environmental features for the good of society in the 521 
first place (Emery, 2014). It is apparent, therefore, that an intrinsic motivation for the 522 
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conducting of environmental behaviours could exist contemporaneously with a financial 523 
motive. 524 
Investigating the Crowding-Out Theory 525 
Given this prior (and seemingly intrinsically motivated) ‘environmental behaviour’, which 526 
had been carried out without remuneration, and pending the removal of a relatively recent 527 
payment for it, crowding-out concerns are not ill-founded. However, our interviews indicated 528 
that the farmers intend to continue with some form of environmental measures subsidised by 529 
the AES after the schemes end (see Table 2). 530 
[Table 2 Here]  531 
 532 
Table 2 demonstrates that the farmers involved with any AES showed interest in maintaining 533 
some environmental focus. As could be expected, the HLS farmers wanted to continue with 534 
the scheme. These farmers tended to express less uncertainty than ELS farmers since they 535 
were confident in reapplying for the CS schemes with the understanding that these schemes 536 
would be similar in fashion to HLS. Organic farmers also seemed undeterred, stating that 537 
since they operated with a strong environmental awareness prior to OELS, the termination of 538 
this scheme would not result in a change to their farming methods. It is the future intentions 539 
of ELS farmers which provide the most significant outcome, who according to crowding-out 540 
theory would have simply stopped engaging with any AES requirements because they have 541 
come to expect payment for their delivery.  Moreover, not only do farmers commit to 542 
continuing with prior valued behaviours, but to some (but by no means all) new behaviours 543 
initiated by the ELS.  544 
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  “Most of the farm will come back into crop production in some shape or form … well I'll 545 
keep certain [AES] features where they're convenient for the farm but the rest will probably 546 
go” (farmer 12)  547 
“I think if the environmental schemes went, some things wouldn’t get done, but I think a lot 548 
of them [farmers] would hold on to a lot of these practices” (farmer 3) 549 
  “Well these buffer strips, it’s all part of the greening stuff, it’s all sort of trying to carry it 550 
on a little bit I suppose, so I expect people will still carry on doing things like that” (farmer 551 
10) 552 
 553 
This finding somewhat complicates the crowding-out theory and might, in fact, provide 554 
evidence for crowding-in, with newly learnt behaviours becoming intrinsically rather than 555 
financially motivated upon termination of the scheme. Many farmers highlight specific 556 
features that they will continue to implement on their farm which they were not doing before 557 
the scheme, despite the lack of payment for these options. These are mentioned above, and 558 
include the maintenance of buffer strips and grass margins (particularly for ELS farmers), 559 
bird seed plots and pollen and nectar mixes, as well as decreased fertiliser use. These features 560 
tended to be attributed to providing wider benefits, such as reduced costs or improving the 561 
running of the farm, rather than solely environmental gains (Sutherland, 2011); 562 
 "I think the ELS has sort of, protected some of it, like you know the hedges and that sort of 563 
thing, I think it has protected those because they are then worth something to the farmer, 564 
they’re not then going to, you know, they’re going to look after them” (farmer 3) 565 
 "[I’ll keep] some of the pollen and nectar mixes and some of the grass margins against the 566 
ditches and hedges they're quite valuable, if it snows, I can use the margin to escape! ... 567 
You can certainly see the benefits to wildlife and it keeps you away from those features for 568 
the machinery" (farmer 12) 569 
This finding certainly supports the work of McHenry (1998) who suggests that farmers may 570 
be continuing with 'symbolic' conservationist practice and claiming their rationale is as such, 571 
when in reality these practices are providing more desirable instrumental benefits to the farm. 572 
Crucially, this response may also indicate that farmers were never producing environmental 573 
goods out of some intrinsic, altruistic motivation to serve society in the first place. Rather, 574 
18 
 
they were farming in a way they perceived as being sensible and sustainable which happened 575 
to also be delivering environmental goods and creating the rural landscape appreciated by so 576 
many.  Into the future, they will continue to adopt the same pragmatic approach, adopting 577 
newly acquired knowledge and practices introduced through the scheme where they are seen 578 
as providing added-value (for whatever reason) to the farm. 579 
The primary management practice that was identified on numerous occasions as likely to be 580 
dropped was the restrictions on hedge cutting, reflecting the work of Mills et al. (2013) who 581 
find that hedge-cutting regulations were a major deterrent for farmers’ engagement in AES. 582 
Oreszczyn and Lane (2000) showed how hedgerows form a vital part of the cultural landscape 583 
as well as providing environmental benefits, the latter of which is predominantly the focus of 584 
many AES (see also Baudry et al., 2000; Burel and Baudry, 1995; Oreszczyn, 2000). 585 
Crucially, Oreszczyn and Lane (2000) highlight that well-maintained hedgerows are of social 586 
symbolic importance to farmers; managing them correctly is tied up with notions of good 587 
farming practice. Farmers would usually cut hedges on an annual basis, however it was felt 588 
that leaving them to grow for an additional year or two (as demanded by the ELS) was only 589 
having a more destructive impact on the environment: 590 
 "The hedges, we're not at all happy with that, you only cut them every two years and it 591 
takes you far longer cutting them the second year and I 'spect you're hearing that 592 
everywhere, the hedges are not growing the same as the ones that are cut every year. ...It's 593 
damaging them we think cutting them every two years" (farmer 5) 594 
 "One thing we disagreed with a lot at the entry and the higher level, you could only cut 595 
hedges every third year, which we feel is a very retrograde step. Because when the hedges 596 
become very big, and when you do go the third year, you absolutely massacre them...the 597 
sticks are splintered and the hedge almost dies, takes years to recover, so that's the one 598 
thing I know that's gonna' be dropped... we always like to trim them, every year, it keeps 599 
them much thicker and we got proof that if we leave them for three years the hedges get 600 
real rank so there's nowhere for the birds to nest obviously and then when you go in again 601 
you absolutely massacre them... a lot of people have found this and said it to them, I said it 602 
to the inspector you know, .. he agreed with me! Like he said, this is the rule, so you know, 603 
ill thought out rule... apart from the hedge cutting, you know, that's one of the elements no 604 
one agreed with at the start of it and it's been proven to be flawed" (farmer 10) 605 
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  606 
Given their symbolic significance, dropping this hedgerow practice, whilst justified by 607 
farmers through environmental argumentation, may in fact be motivated by a desire to return 608 
to more traditional methods of hedgerow management, which are in keeping with the more 609 
conventional good farming aesthetic. Though machine damage was also a consequence of 610 
implementing this rule, farmers choose to emphasise the negative environmental impact 611 
associated with this practice, indicating that they have learnt to engage discursively with 612 
environmental issues in order to legitimise their arguments. Having found the AES hedge 613 
cutting requirements to be ineffective, farmers are choosing to return to practices based on 614 
their own local knowledge, rather than that of 'experts'. Doing so for apparently 615 
environmental reasons, reinforces their identity as responsible stewards of the countryside, 616 
providing a specific example of an area where farmers are declaring their knowledge as 617 
superior (McHenry, 1998).   618 
This demonstrates that it is equally over-simplistic to assume crowding-in.  Farmers do not 619 
automatically become intrinsically motivated to carry on with behaviours they have been paid 620 
for, and nor do they become intrinsically de-motivated to continue with longstanding 621 
behaviours that preceded the subsidy (crowding-out).  The complex array of continued and 622 
discontinued behavioural intentions demonstrates the farmers’ agency and their pragmatic 623 
ability to adopt, continue or abandon behaviours according to their perceptions of what is best 624 
for their farms. 625 
 626 
 627 
 628 
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Farmers' perceptions of the environment 629 
Several comments were made referring to the differences between this generation and the past 630 
generation of farmers in their engagement with the environment: 631 
  "You need to work with the environment, British farmers in the seventies and eighties, and 632 
even up to the nineties got a real bad name for bashing the countryside, … here we've 633 
planted hedges where hedges were never planted, we've put trees in where trees never were, 634 
and a lot of people have done the same ... we've gone through that stage with all the old 635 
boys that came through the second world war, saying 'it's wrong, it's wrong, it's wrong', to a 636 
new generation of great understanding of, er, nature, conservation and the environment" 637 
(farmer 2) 638 
 "I always think about, I know especially a few farmers, some of them, I know in the sixties 639 
it was all about cutting trees and grubbing up, I think it probably did affect them 640 
[environmental schemes] because they were having to plant trees again and hedges, but I 641 
think they wanted to, because they realised what they were missing ... I think farmers, you 642 
know the perception of farmers, you know the slash and burn effect, think they're far past 643 
that, and now, they look at it from a different point of view." (farmer 8) 644 
  645 
Despite these quotes suggesting farmers have taken on an increased environmental outlook 646 
and approach, a very common argument was that farmers are not and have never intentionally 647 
been environmental villains: 648 
"Do they [policy-makers] think we would deliberately go out and poison the ground or kill 649 
the trees, or whatever? Without them, without the land, we have nothing." (farmer 5) 650 
 "You have to consider the environment because it's what we live and breathe so why 651 
destroy it? [environmental practice] is something they [farmers] should be doing 652 
anyway... you are guardian of the environment and so if there are things there to improve 653 
and its worth doing, then why not?" (farmer 12) 654 
 655 
Evidently, whilst some farmers may engage with more conservationist techniques than others, 656 
the farmers in our case study indicated a genuine and personal care for the environment. 657 
Given the apparent association between farming identities and environmental diligence, it 658 
seems illogical that these farmers would ever have acted in a way that was deliberately 659 
neglectful of the environment. We might suggest, therefore, that farmers’ environmental 660 
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rhetoric has changed more than their actual practices, with an increased recognition of the 661 
need to rectify their ‘bad name’ in the eyes of wider society (Setten, 2004; McHenry, 1998).  662 
Many perceive that ‘bad name’ to be unfair and demotivating and equally recognise that 663 
wider societal moral discourses and impressions of farming had shifted far more than the 664 
actual practices of farming warranted: 665 
"From hero, arguably, to villain in one lifetime, doing the same thing, how attitudes have 666 
changed" (farmer 9) 667 
 668 
Much of farmers’ discussions about their pre-, in- and post- subsidy environmental behaviours 669 
must be understood in terms of this perceived need to set straight the negative stereotypes of 670 
farming which emerged rather suddenly in the 1980s.  These stereotypes reversed the 671 
previous high regard in which they had been held and caused genuine hurt and demoralisation 672 
among farmers (Lowe et al., 1997).  Somewhat belatedly, farmers have had to tap into this 673 
conservation discourse in order to speak in terms understandable to society at large.  This is 674 
not to dismiss the possibility that farmers’ behaviours and/or values toward the environment 675 
have genuinely changed.  Indeed, norms are never fixed but constantly modified and 676 
negotiated in social interaction.  This also helps us understand why farmers indicate ELS has 677 
little-altered their behaviour in spite of the new types of action it has clearly instigated;  they 678 
make this argument to point out that it was they who produced the valued landscape in the 679 
first place (Emery, 2014). 680 
Farmers' wider views on the schemes 681 
Having established that many farmers do consider environmental care to be integral to their 682 
identity as good farmers, it might seem surprising that negative experiences of AES were 683 
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frequently elicited. However, we suggest that this points towards a problem with AES 684 
themselves rather than a problem with engaging with conservationist practices. 685 
 "I've had dialogues with chaps who run these things [AES] and even they don't really 686 
understand... I don't think they really understand the rules as it is on the piece of paper, we 687 
can interpret them better than they can now" (farmer 4) 688 
  "It's inspections, inspections, bane of my life… they are never ending, and that's why we 689 
said 'for heaven's sake, cut down on the number of inspections, you must know who the 690 
dodgy people are' ... they seem to make it just so they can catch you out if they can" 691 
(farmer 8) 692 
 "You're made to feel like a criminal by those who oversee it" (farmer 9) 693 
 694 
From these extracts, and based on the wider discussions with farmers, it is clear that they do 695 
not have an issue with implementing environmental measures per se but with the nature of the 696 
schemes and the way in which they are managed.  Whilst on occasions farmers valued the 697 
environmental benefits delivered by ELS, on other occasions they questioned the 698 
environmental value of the schemes (for instance relating to the hedge-cutting requirements).  699 
This provides an opportunity for farmers to challenge the knowledge and authority of the 700 
conservationists and bureaucrats implementing the schemes (Harrison and Burgess, 1998) and 701 
endorses their own knowledge and role in the production of valued environmental landscapes.  702 
This is why it is crucially important not to assume environmental behaviours and AES to be 703 
synonymous (cf. Lokhorst et al., 2011).  This is relevant for our discussion of crowding-out 704 
since, in combination with the evidence presented earlier, it demonstrates that when farmers 705 
talk about continuing with ‘environmental behaviours’ this does not automatically mean they 706 
will continue to fulfil the stipulations of the AES.  Equally, when they talk about 707 
discontinuing AES it does not automatically mean they will cease to carry out what they 708 
perceive to be important environmental behaviours.  In order to conclude our analysis, it is 709 
necessary to bring the foregoing insights together in order to problematise crowding theories 710 
in terms of the way in which they interpret (and over-simplify) farmers’ motives. 711 
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Conclusions 712 
Our research provides evidence of a rather complicated set of factors underlying farmers’ 713 
motives, practices and intentions prior to, during, and following AES involvement.  Whilst 714 
we found glimpses of evidence that could superficially support crowding theories (both 715 
crowding-out and –in), the stated intentions of our sample of farmers post-ELS imply that 716 
(again superficially) concerns about crowding upon the termination of ELS (Hodge and 717 
Reader, 2010) are ill-founded.  Our main argument, however, and the reason for labelling the 718 
above-mentioned findings as ‘superficial’, is that crowding theories are based on a set of 719 
assumptions and simplifications that do not adequately help us interpret the relationship 720 
between farmers’ motives, practices and intentions.  We propose four inter-linked reasons as 721 
to why any inferences about crowding have to be treated cautiously. 722 
Firstly, intrinsic and economic motives cannot be seen as mutually exclusive.  Hence to 723 
suggest that one type of motivation can simply replace another (or crowd-it-out) over-724 
simplifies matters (Wilson and Hart, 2000, 2001).  We demonstrated that farmers continue to 725 
nurture non-economic motives for AES practices in spite of coming to be financially 726 
incentivised for them, and we also demonstrated that farmers may continue to derive 727 
economic or instrumental benefits from the continuance of AES practices (e.g. reductions in 728 
artificial fertiliser use) in spite of the removal of the direct subsidy payment. 729 
Secondly, and following on from the above point, we question whether farmers’ motives for 730 
the supply of public goods pre-AES were ever entirely intrinsic in the first place.  ‘Intrinsic’ 731 
suggests an internal motivation for a certain behaviour (Frey and Jegen, 2001).  However, if 732 
farmers are undertaking certain practices (for instance, the supply of public goods on account 733 
of a stewardship ethic) for social reasons then these should still be considered to have an 734 
external dimension to them.  Whilst farmers might not derive direct financial benefit from 735 
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their compliance with normative expectations or an altruistic outlook, they do derive social 736 
endorsements and recognition which can confer benefits upon them (for instance being more 737 
likely to benefit from reciprocal relations with other farmers, or being valued – and less likely 738 
to be interfered with – by wider society and regulators).  Moreover, many of the public goods 739 
supplied by farmers prior to AES engagement can also be considered as incidental to the 740 
business of farming; hence they were produced, in part at least, through farmers’ desire to 741 
secure an external income rather than for some intrinsic or environmental motive on the part 742 
of the farmer (Sutherland, 2011).  If motives were never entirely intrinsic, and if intrinsic and 743 
extrinsic motives develop simultaneously and cannot be neatly separated, then attempts to 744 
reliably witness the crowding-out effect empirically need to be treated with caution.  745 
Third, farmers’ conceptualisation of what constitutes an environmental/conservation practice 746 
often differs from what a conservationist or academic would consider.  We have shown that 747 
some farmers do not see AES practices and conservation practices to be synonymous and 748 
they endorse their own environmental credentials by challenging the authority and knowledge 749 
on which AES measures are based.  Fourth, the farmers’ in our study use environmental and 750 
conservation-oriented discourses to justify certain farming practices that others would not 751 
consider as such.  This represents farmers’ ability to tap-into wider societal values in a 752 
somewhat strategic manner (McHenry, 1998).  Taken together these third and fourth points 753 
allow us to suggest that the way in which farmers articulate their practices and intentions as 754 
‘environmental’ should not be treated sceptically (since who is to say they are wrong?) but 755 
should be used cautiously when making predictions and theorisations of what farmers do and 756 
why.   757 
Leaving aside the argument of what does and does not constitute an ‘environmental’ 758 
behaviour our empirical results and interpretation lead us to believe that: the majority of 759 
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valued pre-ELS practices will continue despite the withdrawal of the scheme, and; practices 760 
newly instigated under ELS will be retained or dropped by farmers according to their own 761 
circumstances and a complex of intrinsic, normative and instrumental factors.  Whilst this is a 762 
small study warranting larger-scale testing of these predictions, we believe the findings to be 763 
of importance to AES and PES practitioners and theorists alike. 764 
On a cultural level, our findings are not able to provide substantiated evidence for normative 765 
shifts in conceptualisations of the ‘good farmer’ on account of farmers’ engagement in AES.  766 
This is despite evidence that some practices are likely to be retained by farmers post-ELS, 767 
and it is despite evidence of the increasing incorporation of conservation discourse into 768 
farmers’ individual and collective expressions of identity. We certainly do not wish to 769 
dismiss the idea that notions of the good farmer are changing, or have changed as a result of 770 
AES, but we caution against hasty judgements which might reflect mis-interpretations of 771 
what is constituted as an ‘environmental’ behaviour by different parties and the fact that 772 
farmers may engage strategically with conservation discourses to justify the continuance of 773 
existing practices and outlooks (which they may, or may not, genuinely believe to be 774 
beneficial to the environment).  However, building on our previous work into the incessantly 775 
negotiated character of farmers’ cultural values (Emery, 2010, 2015) we maintain that 776 
farmers’ discursive engagement with environmental narratives should not be viewed purely 777 
as rhetorical.  Rather, it is precisely through discursive (as well as wider social) interaction 778 
between different groups/individuals that norms are constantly challenged and modified. 779 
Our engagement with crowding theories in relation to AES termination suggest that they are a 780 
useful heuristic tool for exploring the issues associated with paying for environmental 781 
services or public goods. In the context of the increasing roll-out of PES management 782 
interventions under neoliberal environmental policy (Arsel and Büscher, 2012) it is essential 783 
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that the rationale for such approaches is challenged.  However, as an explanatory mechanism, 784 
crowding theories appear overly simplistic because they treat motives as mutually exclusive 785 
and oppositional and fail to recognise that the behaviours they seek to explore are 786 
multifariously interpreted and highly contested in practice and discourse.   787 
Whilst crowding-out theories rightly challenge processes of environmental commodification, 788 
they need to do so in a more integrated manner.  For it is through the very blurring of 789 
economic and cultural motives (and the failure to recognise them as such) that neoliberal 790 
agendas and their consequences are propagated (Emery, 2015; Stock et al., 2014).  Our 791 
evidence suggests that farmers will remain pragmatic in the everyday process of decision-792 
making that continues to characterise farm work and life.  In the face of uncertainty, and the 793 
ever-changing contexts in which they operate, farmers will continue to weigh-up the 794 
practical, economic and social benefits of alternative courses of action.  Our understanding 795 
and interpretation of their motives, practices and intentions must therefore also account for 796 
the complex interactions between these parameters.   797 
Notes: 798 
1
 https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/countryside-stewardship-get-paid-for-799 
environmental-land-management 800 
2
 Indeed many farmers in conversation will justify their application to ELS as a means of 801 
recouping the production-linked subsidies they had lost. 802 
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Table 1: Respondent characteristics 1016 
Farmer Farm Type Farm Size (Ha) Age of Farmer 
(years) 
Current AES 
Involvement  
Duration of AES 
Involvement 
(years) 
1 Livestock (beef/dairy) 77 51-60 ELS 5-10 
2 Arable 202 51-60 HLS >10 
3 Livestock (dairy) 202 41-50 OELS 5-10 
4 Livestock (dairy) 101 51-60 ELS 5-10 
5 Livestock (beef/sheep) 147 >60 ELS 5-10 
6 Livestock (suckler pigs) 182 >60 HLS 5-10 
7 Mixed 4000 >60 HLS >10 
8 Livestock (dairy) 156 >60 OELS 5-10 
9 Arable 450 51-60 Withdrawn <5 
10 Livestock (dairy) 81 51-60 ELS 5-10 
11 Mixed 344 41-50 HLS >10 
12 Arable 162 41-50 ELS >10 
 1017 
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 1018 
 1019 
 1020 
Farmer AES implemented on farm Intended action with regard to 
AES 
1 ELS Scheme to end but maintain 
some environmental measures 
2 HLS Keep HLS scheme 
3 OELS Keep OELS measures despite 
termination of scheme, having 
not changed practice to enter 
into scheme. Felt unaffected by 
scheme ending 
4 ELS Doubtful that they would 
continue with AES but would 
continue to work with 
environment 
5 ELS End of AES but retain some 
environmental measures on farm 
6 HLS Unsure but assumed to continue 
with HLS 
7 ELS/OELS/HLS Where the money was headed 
would depend whether organic 
parts of the farm would remain 
organic but would maintain 
some environmental features 
8 OELS Intend to continue farming 
organically using same practices 
as under OELS scheme 
9 None N/A, farm to remain intensified 
10 ELS End of AES but retain some 
environmental measures on farm 
11 HLS Keep HLS scheme 
12 ELS End of AES but retain some 
environmental measures on farm 
Table 2: Table indicating likely outcome for AES and environmental measures on farms in 
relation to prior AES involvement 
